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INTRODUCTION
The dissemination of "obscene" matter and attempts by public and
non-public bodies to restrict its circulation constitute a serious social
problem., Substantial effort has been expended in attempts to mobil-
ize public opinion,2 secure legislation 3 and enforce various regulatory
schemes. Litigation volume alone indicates considerable social con-
cern. During the fourteen years since the United States Supreme
Court split four to four affirming4 the censorship of Edmund Wilson's
Memoirs of Hectate County,s cases involving obscenity issues have
entertained the attention of state and lower federal courts on count-
less occasions. In the Supreme Court itself, after a history of relative
inattention, full review has been granted in at least seven instances. 6
This volume of legislative and judicial concern indicates the existence
of intense and successful public pressure. It is also indicative of strict
enforcement of constitutional standards by a court sensitive to as-
saults on free speech guarantees.
Any extensive consideration of the historical context of the problem
is beyond the scope of this note.7 Also not treated in detail is that
extensive body of lower federal and state court decisions which reflect
1. See, e.g., SUBCOMM. ON POSTAL OPERATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON
POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE, 86TH CONG., 2d SESS., REPORT ON OBSCENE MATTER
SENT THROUGH THE MAIL (Comm. Print 1960) [hereinafter cited as 1960 SUB-
COMMITTEE REPORT]; Hearings on H.R. 11454 Before a Subcommittee on Special
Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1960) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 11454 Hearings]; Obscenity and the Arts,
20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 533, 621 (1955); JOINT COMMITTEE ON CON-
TINUING LEGAL EDUCATION OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE AND THE AMERI-
CAN BAR Ass'N, DRAFTING AN OBSCENITY STATUTE (1961).
2. E.g., Obscenity and the Arts, supra note 1.
3. 1960 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT; H.R. 11454 Hearings.
4. Doubleday & Co., Inc. v. New York, 335 U.S. 848 (1948).
A specific example of legislative activity is that of Florida where the obscenity
law has been amended or rewritten in 1955, 1957, 1959, 1961.
5. Doubleday & Co. Inc., v. New York, 272 App. Div. 799, 71 N.Y.S.2d 736, aff'd,
297 N.Y. 687, 77 N.E.2d 6 (1947).
6. Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962); Marcus v. Search
Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961); Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S.
43 (1961) ; Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959) ; Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476 (1957); Kingsley Books v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957); Butler v.
Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
7. There are several illuminating treatments of the problem in its historical
context. The symposium presented in Obscenity and the Arts, supra note 1,
provides brief treatment in connection with the various topics. PAUL & SCHWARTZ,
FEDERAL CENSORSHIP, OBSCENITY IN THE MAIL (1961) is quite detailed and dis-
cusses the history of postal censorship. See also, CHAFFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE
UNITED STATES (1941) for a broader treatment, discussing obscenity as one of
many subjects of speech restriction.
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the momentary flux of particular Supreme Court pronouncements and
which treat the determination of what is and what is not obscene.
Rather, attention is focused on non-criminal techniques of obscenity
regulation, particularly the search for and seizure of suspected
material. Accordingly, the Supreme Court's extensive consideration
of this problem in Mfarcus v. Search Warrant8 is emphasized. Proper
perspective dictates that this issue be introduced and considered with
the pressures for obscenity regulation, the test for obscenity and the
various alternative enforcement techniques. Assumptions embodied
in arguments advanced for regulation have not been without effect on
the legislative tests for obscenity. In turn, the conceptual vitality of
these tests has been determinative of the constitutional acceptability
of enforcement schemes.
I. THE OBSCENITY DEBATE, CIRCA 1962
The most important element in the polemics favoring regulation
is the assertion of a causal relation between obscene material and
social misbehavior.9 Characterization of pornography as a large
lucrative business 0 serves but to gloss this assertion with a sense of
urgency.
The existence of this causal relation has received largely uncritical
acceptance. 1 Rising juvenile crime rates have brought efforts at
explanation which in many instances have turned to the alleged effects
of "obscene" literature. 12 A large number of police officials, juvenile
court officers, religious leaders and representatives of groups working
8. 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
9. E.g., SUBCOM.i't. ON POSTAL OPERATIONS OF THE HOUSE C01.MM ON
POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE, 86TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT ON OBSCENE
MATTER SENT THROUGH THE MAIL 15-19 (Comm. Print 1959) [hereinafter cited
as 1959 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT]. This contention is subject to the qualification
that its base is surely highly speculative, particularly since the classification of
much material within the category would excite dispute.
10. E.g., 1960 SUBCOMIrTTEE REPORT 2, 5, 6, 8, 24, 25, 39, 44. Any classification
of material on which such contentions are based will normally reflect only value
predilections which might not receive very wide acceptance except in the instance
of the rankest material. Indeed, at least some advocates of censorship profess
greater fear of the dehabilitating effect of "borderline" material (often not
susceptible to any constitutional regulation under present standards). Hearing on
Circulation of Obscene and Pornographic Material Before a Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 10, 12
(1960) [hereinafter cited as 1960 Hearings.]
11. Lockhart and McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitu-
tional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5, 6-13 (1960); Lockhart and McClure,
Literature, The Law of Obscenity and the Constitution, 38 MINN. L. REV. 295,
304-18 (1954); 1960 Hearings 1-27.
12. E.g., 1960 Hearings 16; H.R. 11454 Hearings 30-31.
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with various child welfare agencies believe that the relationship be-
tween juvenile crime, particularly sex crime, and salacious material
is not only correlative but causal. 13 One result has been the formation
of pressure groups which have achieved a large measure of success
in popularizing arguments for obscenity regulation. 4
Anti-censorship interests,15 while unable to affect significantly the
popularization of their opponents' assumptions, have introduced ma-
terial which seriously questions the scientific bases for their accept-
ance. A notable study done for the American Book Publisher's Council
in 1953 by Marie Jahoda and the staff of the Research Center for
Human Relations of New York University, reached an admittedly
tentative conclusion that any causal role obscene literature might play
is at least limited.16 Moreover, the report noted the lack of direct
research of the problem- and suggested the efficacy of a broad em-
pirical study. 8
A more empirical project, conducted by Sheldon and Elenore Glueck
of Harvard, studied over 90 factors in juvenile delinquency. It failed
even to include the reading habits of the subjects among the factors
considered. 19 The Gluecks found that the delinquents' reading achieve-
ment was low and, indeed, that non-active pursuits, including reading,
were preferred by a low percentage of the control group (7.8%) and
an even lower percentage of the delinquent sample (2.7%). Their
conclusion was that the evidence suggested, if anything, that the
13. See generally ibid.; Obscenity and the Arts, supra note 1, at 533, 621.
14. Authorities cited note 11 supra.
15. The well published fear of the opponent of censorship is often couched in
terms of his apprehension that regulation of material without "redeeming social
value" (definitional criterion applied to obscenity in Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 484 (1957)) may indeed lead to regulation of all literature for a
variety of purposes. In addition, he fears that the classification system itself
will reflect the norms of those who favor massive restriction.
16. H.R. 11454 Hearings 96, 143. The report was entitled "The Impact of Lit-
erature: A Psychological Discussion of Some Assumptions in the Censorship De-
bate," by Marie Jahoda and the staff of the Research Center for Human Relations,
New York University [hereinafter cited as Jahoda]. The report fails to treat the
literature and picture problems differently.
17. Id. at 92.
18. Id. at 141. A research program was suggested, which, it was thought might
bear fruit. Id. at 145-53:
A. Research proposals relevant to clarifying the assumptions made by
different individuals and groups as to what constitutes obscene or harmful
literature. ...
B. Research proposals relevant to establishing the place of literature among
the antecedents of undesirable human conduct....
C. Research proposals relevant to establishing the impact of literature on
the formation of values, attitudes, expectations and opinions ....
19. Obscenity and the Arts, supra note 1, at 596.
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delinquent tends to reject reading, as he does all passive activity,
preferring more active pursuits. 20 The Jahoda group reached a similar
conclusion: "The enjoyment of literature and of other vicarious ex-
periences presupposes a well-developed capacity for the delay of
gratification... the very quality that is lacking in most character
neuroses." 21
Professor of Psychology at Washington University, Dr. Saul Rosen-
zweig, when interviewed by the writer, segregated those who main-
tain that salacious material has an effect on social behavior into two
camps. Some argue that exposure to repeated literary invitations to
vicarious anti-social or deviant sexual expression triggers acts paral-
leling those which the characters perform in the particular material.
The other group argues in Freudian terms that man has certain
libidinal instincts, and that social restrictions serve as a dam behind
which they lie subject to violent eruption. Vicarious experience
through reading is seen as a possible release mechanism, channeling
hostililties away from avenues of anti-social behavior.22
In contrast to the doubt expressed by social scientists, law enforce-
ment and church groups have often asserted the causal relationship
with firmness 23 J. Edgar Hoover said, for example, before the House
Postal Committee:
20. Jahoda 117-18.
21. Id. at 120.
22. Interview with Dr. Saul Rosenzweig, Professor of Psychology, Washing-
ton University, in St. Louis, Feb., 1962.
23. E.g., 1960 SUBCOMAIITTEE REPORT 15-19; Note, 34 MARQ. L. Rnv. 301
(1951); 1960 Hearings.
Mr. Charles H. Keating, Jr., Chief Counsel for the Citizens for Decent Litera-
ture said:
These persons will help "censorship," "art," "borderline," and other unde-
fined words and phrases to disguise their wares of sadism, masochism,
narcissism, cannibalism, cunnilingualism, sodomy, necrophilia, and all the
other rot they peddle which among other things, causes premarital inter-
course, perversion, masturbation in boys, wantonness in girls and weakens
the morality of all it contacts.
H.R. 11454 Heaings 30-31:
Judges Chamber,
39th Judicial District of Pennsylvania, Franklin County,
Chambersburg, Pa., May 11, 1960
Hon. James C. Oliver
House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.
For a long time I have been familiar with this problem and with the work
of Dr. Frederick Wertham, and the testimony received by the congressional
committees. I know we must face the ill-conceived efforts of the libertarian
group in the United States through the American Civil Liberties Union
and writings such as you quoted from the Washington Post to confuse the
issue and to consecrate somehow the purveying of this filth. After someone
Washington University Open Scholarship
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I say that we can no longer afford to wait for the answer. What
near and dear to these professional liberals has been the victim of some
revolting sex crime, perhaps each will come to his senses and realize that
freedom of the press in this area of pornographic publications has no
utilitarian advantage, actual or potential, to the people of the county....
There is no such advantage or need of free expression for the body politic
in the area of sex emphasis or perversion. In using this terminology, I in-
tend to embrace both abnormal sexual relations and the normal sex relation
unduly emphasized. Consider the product of excessive sex promotion in the
press (including radio, TV, and cinema), its potentialities in producing
illegitimate children, thoughtless marriages, broken marriages, neglected
children, delinquency, and criminality. These are the direct outcome of
conceiving infants without forethought or any social fabric likely to guaran-
tee their future rearing. Such results of too much sex are just as harmful to
the body politic, morally and financially, as is the indiscriminate encourage-
ment and promotion through pornographic literature or otherwise of sex
experience of nonconventional type....
Personally I doubt if the subject is one that lends itself to the gathering
of scientific data as to cause and effect, from juvenile exposure to this mass
of sex literature. Even if we could obtain such evidence, I doubt if we have
a mechanism loud and forceful enough to impress it upon the American
people. We would have to overcome the tremendous power which the
pornographers allied to the libertarians and apostles of freedom of the press
it outrance are able to muster. I have practically come to the conclusion
that what we need rather than scientific evidence is to find a larger sound-
ing board so that we can outshout these people.
Id. at 32.
Judges Chambers
Thirty-ninth Judicial District of Pennsylvania,
Chambersburg, Pa., May 19, 1960
Hon. James C. Oliver
House Office Building
Washington, D.C.
I would like to offer this additional thought, which relates to the con-
tinuous drumfire that we as opponents of pornographic publications con-
tinuously meet from the left wing, the misguided apostles of the Civil
Liberties Union and other groups afflicted with an obsession concerning
"constitutional rights." If the latter small minority of citizens continues
to press their desire for absolute rights for themselves, it looks like the
majority of us are going to have to get out of the country and find a haven
somewhere in some other island or continent, in order to maintain a reason-
ably decent and peaceful life....
If, under the common law, the community is not obliged to tolerate the
filth, stench and other unattractive features of junkyards, animal render-
ing plants, fertilizer production and so forth, by virtue of what the courts
have constructed as the police power, why in the world should the com-
munity be hampered in eliminating filth of other varieties by a sacred cow
erected out of the freedom of speech section of the Bill of Rights? This
sacred cow is freedom of speech and press under the cloak of which exposes
children and the weakminded part of our citizenry to pornographic litera-
ture. The police power ought to be coextensive with the need of the whole
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we do know is that in an overwhelmingly large number of cases,
sex crime is associated with pornography. We know that sex
criminals read it, are clearly influenced by it.
I believe pornography is a major cause of sex violence, I believe
that if we can eliminate the distribution of such items among im-
pressionable school children, we shall greatly reduce our frighten-
ing sex crime rate.24
Against such a background of often personal vituperation, 5 the
people for peaceful and decent repose for themselves and families free from
fear of sexual perverts engendered and promoted by the libertarian left wing.
It seems to me our effort to recapture lost legal ground could proceed from
that point....
For materials indicating the confused state of the evidence, see JOINT COMMITTEE
ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE AND THE
AMERIcAN BAR ASS'N, DRAFTING AN OBSCENITY STATUTE (1961).
24. 1960 SUBCOMMIITTEE REPORT 16.
25. 1960 Hearings 3, 5-7, 9-10, hearing testimony of Mr. Charles Keating, Jr.,
Chief Counsel of the Citizens for Decent Literature:
We have had enough in the way of hearings, talk and inaction. What we
want from our legislative, administrative, and judicial branches of govern-
ment is freedom-freedom from filth-now! . . . This material came to
us in response to a relatively few letters mailed from CDL requesting
information and evidence from those citizens who somehow or other seldom
seem to be heard by their Government-and who are never heard by or
represented in any of the mass media of communication, with the exception
of a few important spokesmen such as George Sokolsky, Inez Robb, Loretta
Young, Bishop Sheen, Howard Whitman, Jack Mabley and several others....
On the contrary, attention is given to sensationalists, such as Kinsey,
who draw sweeping conclusions from a handful of selected subjects and
defraud the public by calling their meanderings a scientific study-and
Eberhard and Phyllis Kronhausen, who, finding fellow travelers in erst-
while respectable media manage to disseminate, directly and indirectly,
their absurd and dirty bleatings and pagan ideas. If these people and
their surveys are able to be called scientific, then certainly this collection
of opinion and comment which I have given you, coming from all corners
of America, has a quality much more significant, and cannot be ignored....
It seems strange to me that we credit (I should say our mass media
credit) the unestablished generalities of a few so-called experts but ignore
the overwhelming testimony of the true experts.., like Pitirim Sorokin, J.
Edgar Hoover, juvenile court judges, clergymen, psychologists, court work-
ers, and innumerable others .... There has been the usual opposition by
extremists such as the persistent, illogical, comical and theatrical (but legal-
istically skilled) activities of certain "civil liberties" groups. ... However,
these elements and those foul producers and salesmen of this depravity-
as they use gullible courts and the judiciary apparatus of Government to
thwart the will and desire of the people for decency, can be, I suppose, ex-
cused. The former groups have their ideologies and the latter their profit
motives. Certainly many others are driven by philosophies which are
diametrically opposed to, and advocate the overthrow of either, or both,
our Judeo-Christian standards of morality and our Government.
These, for the reasons suggested, can perhaps be excused, or at least
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Jahoda study provides one of the more balanced assessments of the
positions of the various protagonists, and indicates the effect of the
debate on the normative standards society has developed:
It should be emphasized from the outset that while a psychological
discussion of the impact of books on their readers obviously bears
on the problem of censorship, it is not in itself an approach which
can decide the censorship question. Most of the demands for
censorship are, to be sure, couched in psychological terms; that is,
they maintain that a particular book should be banned because
it may influence the thoughts and actions of its readers in an
undesirable way. And, similarly, some of the arguments against
censorship rest on the assertion that no bad consequences occur.
But this is certainly only part of the matter. Even if we could
present irrefutable evidence for the assertion that bad books are
a major cause of delinquency or of the counter assertion ....
other arguments for or against censorship . . . arguments of so-
cial, political, philosophical or religious nature-may still be ad-
vanced. The "means-end" question that is involved, for instance;
or the question of whether reading certain materials is in itself
sinful, regardless of further consequences; the problem of an-
ticipated and unanticipated consequences of censorship (or the
absence of censorship) for religious, political and other spheres
of life-these problems will not be decided by what psychology
has to say on the nature of the effects of certain literature.
The function of psychology in this debate is to clarify the assump-
tions about human conduct which underlie much of what is said
pro and con, to present whatever evidence there is for the accep-
tance or rejection of these assumptions and to show how more
critical evidence with respect to these psychological assumptions
understood. But, what of our courts? Here is the crux of the problem. Here
is where the floodgates have been opened. Willing but inexperienced prose-
cutors work too little and quit too soon .... Unwilling and inattentive,
easily misled judges seem to be everywhere .... "The experience of the
founder of Christianity having perhaps left in us a vague doubt of the
infallibility of courts of law. .. "
We need not delay, or be sidetracked by, high-sounding arguments about
censorship," about "obscenity being the price of freedom," or about the
so-called therapeutic values claimed for illicit sexual activities, writings.
or pictures, by treatises themselves prurient, which try to justify these
things in a quasiscientific fashion....
Take these "slick" magazines with their emphasis on seductively posed
nude females. To those who say "But whom do they effect and how?" I
reply. "Why disbelieve the countless clergymen who, from their flocks, know
these magazines cause masturbation and other immoral behavior among
boys. .. "
As any lawyer can tell you, it is not a difficult matter to procrastinate
in the courts so when your case comes up for trial or hearing, it will come
up before a judge favorably disposed to your position. This, I would say,
is the major problem....
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may be gathered .... ,,26 The ... test "of obscenity.., is made
identical with its assumed effect. '27
As the Jahoda group intimated, the acceptance of notions as to the
effects of obscenity has left an indelible mark on the law. The premise
has received both tacit and explicit approval in the statutory and
judicial definitions of the material for which regulation is sought.28
Obscenity regulation has often been seen solely as a prophylactic
against suspected invitations of social misbehavior, an analysis which
often obscures other, more demonstrable reasons for some restric-
tion.29
26. Jahoda 102-03, 106.
27. The test discussed in Judge Goodman's opinion in United Staes v. Two
Obscene Books, 99 F. Supp. 760 (N.D. Cal. 1951), a book libel proceeding relating
to the obscenity of Henry Miller's TROPIC OF CANCER and TROPIC OF CAPRICORN.
28. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), e.g., Postal Obscenity Act,
18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1958): "Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile
article, matter, thing, device, or substance...." The word prurient is defined:
"1. [P]ersons having itching, morbid, or lascivious longings; of desire, curiosity,
or propensity, lewd. . . ." WEBSTER, NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1996
(2d ed. 1953). Lascivious is defined: "I. Wanton; lewd; lustful. 2. Tending to
produce voluptuous or lewd emotions. Syn. Licentious, lecherous, libidinous,
salacious. Ant. See Chaste." Id. at 1395.
29. The question need not be asked how many parents would trust their children
with a steady diet of "hard core" or even "borderline" material. The Jahoda
group found that there was a possibility of loss of sensitivity, particularly on the
part of children, as a result of over-exposure to literature of violence and
brutality: "Even in the more secure person excessive and exclusive familiarity
with literature depicting violence, hate and brutality, may influence his view of
the world." Jahoda 140. However, the fact remains that reading with the object
which the Kronhausens attributed as the intent which the author of pornography
seeks to inspire is a function of psychic illness and a symptom thereof. [KRON-
HAUSEN, PORNOGRAPHY AND THE LAw (1959). The authors define pornography
largely in terms of the intent with which the material is produced: "In pornog-
raphy the main purpose is to stimulate erotic response in the reader and that is
all." Id. at 18.] It is not the activity of the normal and the well adjusted:
These may present a particular danger with regard to those youngsters who
are insecure or otherwise maladjusted, and who find in the reading of comic
books an escape from reality which they do not dare to face. The psychologi-
cal function which reading fulfils in their emotional economy [and note the
inference as to all or most reading; at another place the researchers noted
that a "bad" mind with a "good" book may be a worse combination than a
"good" mind with a "bad" book. Jahoda 139-40] is the gratification of
needs which are not being met in the real world. It is likely, though not
yet fully demonstrated, that excessive reading of this kind will intensify
in children the factors which drove them into reading to begin with: an
inability to face the world, apathy with regard to events, a belief that the
individual is hopelessly impotent and driven by uncontrollable forces and,
hence, an acceptance of violence and brutality in the real world. Jahoda 144.
All are reasons for specific types of regulation. See text accompanying note 27
supra for recognition of various reasons for obscenity regulation. Then there is
Washington University Open Scholarship
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL SETTING
The first amendment states in part: "Congress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ... ." As the
language on its face authorizes, the amendment has been applied to
suspected restrictions on free speech by federal authorities.3 But,
since Barron v. Baltimore3" in 1833, the Court has refused to apply
the first eight amendments directly to the states. Rather, the modern
vehicle for protection of Bill of Rights guarantees from state en-
croachment has been the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.32
A definitive mode of analysis has yet to emerge as different members
of the court have charted divergent courses. One of several schools of
thought, often represented by Mr. Justice Black, has viewed the first
amendment as applied to the states by the due process clause in the
fourteenth; another view, articulated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter and
now Mr. Justice Harlan, has pursued the "scheme of ordered liberty"
analysis expressed in Palko v. Connecticut" and Wolf v. Colorado."
The flux of disagreement over the source of the standards to be ap-
plied in Bill of Rights cases has been evident in almost every court
pronouncement. The majority opinion in Times Film Co'rp. v. City of
Chicago" accepted the notion that the first amendment is declaratory
of free speech rights guaranteed under the fourteenth amendment.36
In the same case the Chief Justice also considered the two amendments
together in a dissenting opinion in which three Justices joined.Y7
Mr. Justice Harlan, in his separate opinion in Rot& v. United
States'8 in 1957, found a different and less rigorous standard under the
the reason implicit in the fact that some material is simply patently offensive
to dominant community mores.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. I. E.g., Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957);
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) ; Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47 (1919).
31. 7 Pet. 243 (1833), which held that the first eight amendments apply only
to the federal government and are not applicable to the states.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
33. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
34. 338 U.S. 25 (1949). Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the majority
of the court:
The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-
which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society.
It is therefore implicit in "the concept of ordered liberty" and as such
enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause. Id. at 27-28.
(Emphasis added.)
35. 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
36. Id. at 46.
37. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 50 (1961).
38. 354 U.S. 476, 496 (1957). Alberts v. California was the state case con-
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fourteenth amendment: "We can inquire only whether the state action
so subverts the fundamental liberties implicit in the Due Process
Clause that it cannot be sustained as a rational exercise of power."30
Applying the distinction, he would have held the state statute valid,40
while voting to strike down a similar federal law considered as part of
the consolidated case. This view of the fourteenth amendment has
received the implrimatur of the court in cases such as Palko and Wolf.
The practice of the majority in several recent cases is evidenced in
the approach of Mr. Justice Brennan who has frequently authored
obscenity opinions. Ostensibly he remains a neutral in the contro-
versy, though he joined in Mr. Chief Justice Warren's dissent in
Times Film Corp. In Rot&41 Mr. Justice Brennan stated the test to be
applied to state obscenity regulation as "whether the obscenity provi-
sions of the California Penal Code invade the freedoms of speech and
press as they may be incorporated in the liberty protected from state
action by the Due Process Clause ... .2 Yet he found that both the
California and the Federal obscenity statutes met his constitutional
test. The result of the Brennan approach is to avoid mention of the
first amendment as a source of due process standards, bowing in the
direction of the Frankfurter-Harlan view, while at the same time
robbing the controversy of any substantive vitality by applying
identical standards to state and federal procedures. This approach
would undoubtedly result in one body of case law in free speech ques-
tions, as it did in Marcus, the most recent consideration of a state
statute.4 3 There Mr. Justice Brennan found authority for his position
in cases involving both state and federal regulation, failing to differ-
entiate between the precedents. 44
III. THE FORM AND EFFECT OF THE TEST
A. Short History
Much of the law on which present doctrines are based has arisen
in criminal cases, as this method of regulation has been the most
solidated with Roth. Mr. Justice Harlan concurred as to the result in Alberts,
dissented as to the result in Roth.
39. Id. at 501.
40. Id. at 500.
41. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
42. Id. at 479-80.
43. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
44. It is apparent that concepts implicit in several of the first eight amend-
ments are read into the "due process" clause of the fourteenth amendment by at
least some Justices. Specifically, portions of the first, fourth and fifth as discussed
in the cases of present concern. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 672 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting). See also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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widely employed. 45 The two issues to which the Court has devoted
primary attention have been the test for obscenity,"6 and, more re-
cently, scienter as a requisite for criminal prosecution.47 While the
primary concern of this note is with the application of the test in
civil enforcement schemes, the sophisticated nature of the test 8 com-
pels its consideration in conjunction with regulation techniques.
The development of the present standard for obscenity began with
The Queen v. Hicklin49 in 1868, which announced a test turning on
two elements-prurience and offensiveness. However, the prurient
effect was to be measured in terms of the impact of selected passages
on the most susceptible members of the society, whether the corrupt-
ible would be corrupted.5 0 In 1913, despite Judge Learned Hand's
protest that mid-victorian morality was thereby institutionalized as a
literary norm, that test was formally accepted in this country.5 1
45. Postal Obscenity Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1958): "Every obscene, lewd,
lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile article, matter, thing, device, or substance...
is declared to be nonmailable matter .... Whoever knowingly uses the mails ....
LA. Rsv. STAT. § 14: 106 (Supp. 1961):
Obscenity is the intentional .. . production, sale, exhibition, gift, or adver-
tisement with the intent to primarily appeal to the prurient interest of the
average person, of any lewd, lascivious, filthy or sexually indecent written
composition, printed composition, book, magazine, pamphlet, newspaper,
story paper, writing, phonograph record, picture, drawing, motion picture
film, figure, image .... Whoever commits the crime of obscenity shall be....
Brown v. Kingsley Books, 354 U.S. 436, 437, 441-42 (1957).
46. E.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Butler v. Michigan,
352 U.S. 380 (1957); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
47. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959). The court struck down a Los
Angeles city ordinance which did away with the element of scienter and imposed
what amounted to strict liability for the contents of any publication in the hands
of the defendant, who in this case operated a retail book and magazine store in
Los Angeles. He had at least several thousand new and used books in stock, most
of which were purchased from dealers and publishers in New York on reliance of
book trade advertising. Lockhart and McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The
Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. Rsv. 5, 43 & n.229 (1960).
48. Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUPREME COURT
REV. 3.
49. [18681 3 Q.B. 360.
50. "I think the test of obscenity is this, whether the tendency of the matter
charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to
such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this may fall."
Id. at 371.
51. United States v. Kennerley, 209 Fed. 119, 120-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1913):
I hope it is not improper for me to say that the rule as laid down, however
consonant it may be with mid-Victorian morals, does not seem to me to answer
to the understanding and morality of the present time .... To put thought
in leash to the average conscience of the time is perhaps tolerable, but to
fetter it by the necessities of the lowest and least capable seems a fatal policy.
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Hand's expression of reluctant acceptance was followed by a line of
decisions expressing ambivalence toward, if not rejection of, the
Hicklin rule.-2 In 1957 Butler v. Michigan3 disposed of the "'most
susceptible' and 'isolated passages'" factors in the Hicklin formula
by striking down a statute in which the standard was the potential
deleterious effect of selected passages on minors.5 4
The test in its present form asks two questions: "whether to the
average person applying contemporary community standards, the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the
prurient interest,"15 and whether the material may "be deemed so
offensive on... [its] face as to affront current community standards
of decency .... ""
B. Rot i. United States and Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day
Shortly after the Butler decision, the Court in Alberts v. CaliforniaT
and Roth 1?. United States"8 formulated a standard to fill the void
created by the supposed demise of Hicklin earlier in the term. Con-
solidating the cases and ignoring any possible question about whether
obscenity was present,5 9 the Court announced that obscene materials
are beyond the protection of the first and fourteenth amendments~0
52. E.g., United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1936); United States
v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1930); United States v. One Book Called
"Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934);
Obscenity and the ATts, 20 LAw & CONTEIP. PROB. 533, 621 (1955).
53. 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
54. Ibid.
55. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
56. Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 482 (1962). Further, censor-
ship may not be instituted to curtail the advocacy of ideas. Kingsley Int'l Pictures
Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of New York, 360 U.S. 684, 688 (1959).
57. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
58. Ibid.
59. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 480-81 (1957). Alberts had been
running a mail-order business from Los Angeles and was convicted by the Judge
of the Municipal Court of the Beverly Hills Judicial District, upon waiver of ajury trial. Roth had conducted a business in New York in which he published,
advertised and sold magazines, photographs and books. He was convicted by ajury on four of twenty-six counts of using the mail in violation of the federal
obscenity statute.
60. Ibid. A tack reminiscent of Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952)
in which the petitioner presented a petition to the Chicago City Council in in-
flammatory terms calling for the maintenance of segregation. In upholding the
conviction the Court based its decision on the fact that libel is outside the protec-
tion of the first amendment, calling the petition a "group libel." Indications that
obscenity would similarly be found outside first amendment protection were found
in at least two prior cases, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72(1942) ; Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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The Court confounded at least some observers, since no use was
made of the "clear and present danger" test, either in its original
form, or as modified in Dennis v. United States.61 Thereby, at the level
of justification for not finding first amendment protection, the Court
avoided any pitfall occasioned by assumptions as to the effect of ob-
scenity. The test which the Court promulgated, however, was a differ-
ent matter. Stress was laid on the effect on the average man,62 con-
sideration of the material as a whole,63 and the fact that material
"having even the slightest redeeming social importance ... ,64 would
receive protection. 5 The kernel of the definition was that obscenity is
material which appeals to the prurient interest." Applied as a gloss,
which, however, seems to indicate the operative criterion on which the
Court has based subsequent decisions, was the characterization of
obscenity as "utterly without redeeming social importance."67
Five years later the Court found that the standard in Roth included
an index of "offensiveness," 68 a concept not directly articulated
therein. Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day,69 arose from an administra-
tive hearing in which the Judicial Officer of the Postal Department
barred a shipment of petitioner's magazines from the mails on the
grounds that they were "obscene" 70 under the Comstock Act.71 The
magazines contained photographs of nude male models and were de-
signed to appeal to homosexuals. The Judicial Officer had determined
they had "prurient appeal," but the Court held they were not beyond
61. 341 U.S. 494 (1951). The court modified the original doctrine developed by
Mr. Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) which re-
quired a clear and present danger as interpreted in Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (concurring opinion) by Mr. Justice Brandeis. Id. at 379.
"Whether the evil apprehended was so substantial as to justify the stringent
restriction interposed by the legislature."
In Dennis the Court upheld convictions under the Smith Act which were for
conspiring to teach and advocate the overthrow of the United States Government
by force and violence. In that opinion the Court subordinated the present danger
factor in the analysis under the rubric of probable. Employment of such a test
would automatically force the Court to find some degree of causal relation between
the suppressed material and some substantive evil which the legislation seeks to
regulate.
62. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
63. Ibid.
64. Id. at 484.
65. Ibid.
66. Id. at 487.
67. Id. at 484.
68. Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 482 (1962).
69. 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
70. Ibid.
71. Statute cited note 45 supra.
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contemporary notions of rudimentary decency under any permissible
constitutional standard.
Mr. Justice Harlan read the "prurient interest" formula of Roth as
merely the element necessary to subject an "offensive" publication to
prosecution."2 He chose the formulation of an Australian jurist who
had so analysed the Hicklin requirement of prurience:
As soon as one reflects that the word "obscene," as an ordinary
English word, has nothing to do with corrupting or depraving
susceptible people, and that it is used to describe things which
are offensive to current standards of decency and not things
which may induce to sinful thoughts, it becomes plain, I think,
that Cockburn, C.J.... was not propounding a logical definition
of the word "obscene," but was merely explaining that particular
characteristic which was necessary to bring an obscene publica-
tion within the law relating to obscene libel. The tendency to
deprave is not the characteristic which makes a publication ob-
scene but is the characteristic which makes an obscene publication
criminal. It is at once an essential element in the crime and the
justification for the intervention of the common law. But it is
not the whole and sole test of what constitutes an obscene libel.
There is no obscene libel unless what is published is bothb offensive
according to current standards of decency and calculated or likely
to have the effect described in R. [egina] v. Hicklin . . .
This formulation can be examined on two levels, both bearing
directly on the enforcement problem. In the first place, it is necessary
to ask what such a test means substantively, what kinds of materials
will it affect? Secondly, what is its conceptual vitality for application
by lower courts and law enforcement officers?
The meaning of Rothb with respect to substantive application has
proved somewhat obscure. The Court abstracted the issues and ig-
nored the qualities of the material presented, 74 although there were
efforts to make the regulation of pornography the dispositive question
in the case. The Solicitor General argued that so-called "hard-core"
material accounted for ninety per cent of the federal convictions. He
also sent to the Court during its deliberations a considerable sample of
material seized by the Post Office under the Comstock statute. Tr How-
ever, in the eyes of Justice Harlan, some of the material could not be
classified as pornography. 6
One researcher has concluded that by the inclusion of the question
72. Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 484-85 (1962).
73. Ibid.
74. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481 n.8 (1957).
75. Lockhart and McClure, Obscenity Censorship: The Core Constitutional
Issue-What is Obscene?, 7 UTAH L. REV. 289, 295 (1961).
76. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 507-08 (1957). Mr. Justice Harlan
indicates that he believes that the only federal regulation consonant with the
Constitution would be that of "hard-core" pornography.
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of redeeming social value, a majority of the Court has attempted to
limit the definition of obscenity to hard-core pornography 77 A com-
mercial venture obviously dependent on such analysis has recently
been launched.78 Support for this view has developed as a result of
three per curiam decisions during 1957 and 1958."9 The Court found
the publication of a magazine for homosexuals, 0 two for nudists,81
and a movie in which there were repeated scenes of nudity and sexual
intimacy,82 not obscene under the Rot& test. The Manual decision is
perhaps the clearest evidence yet developed for that opinion. The
Court characterized the quality which it established in equal dignity
with prurience as "patent offensiveness or indecency,"' 8 3 then found
77. Lockhart and McClure, supra note 75, at 295.
78. EROS is a new quarterly devoted to the subjects of Love and Sex. In the
few short weeks since its birth, EROS has established itself as the rave of
the American intellectual community-and the rage of prudes everywhere!
And it's no wonder: EROS handles the subjects of Love and Sex with com-
plete candor. The publication of this magazine-which is frankly and
avowedly concerned with erotica-has been enabled by recent court decisions
ruling that a literary piece or painting, though explicitly sexual in content,
has a right to be published if it is a genuine work of art.
EROS is a genuine work of art. Its artists, writers and rewriters are
the most talented in the world. EROS makes no concessions to subliteracy
or bad taste....
The publication buoys the confidence of its readers with some of its own, "EROS
unconditionally guarantees full refund of the price of any issue of the magazine
which fails to reach you because of U.S. Postal Office Censorship interference."
EROS, advertising literature, EROS Magazine, Inc., 1962.
79. Sunshine Books Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958), reversing 249
F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1957) dealing with a nudist publication which the court of
appeals noted was largely devoted to views of the genitals and other private parts
of men, women and children normally covered in public by clothing; One, Inc. v.
Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958), reversing 241 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1957) which
involved a magazine for homosexuals declared non-mailable by the post office.
The court of appeals found that the magazine did not conform to its announced
purpose of viewing the homosexual problem from a scientific, cultural and critical
standpoint; Mounce v. United States, 355 U.S. 180 (1957), reversing per ouriain
247 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1957) again concerned with a nudist publication in which
the court of appeals adopted the district court determination on much the same
grounds as did the district court in Sunshine Books; Times Film Corp. v. City of
Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1957), reversing 244 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1957) where the
court of appeals had found the movie "Game of Love," "a series of illicit sexual
intimacies and acts," id. at 436; Lockhart and McClure, supra note 75, at 293
(where conclusions are drawn on the basis of three of these four decisions).
Significantly, the reversals in all four of these cases were based on a simple




83. Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 482 (1962).
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a journal for homosexuals not obscene.8 4 If indeed the Court is
limiting its definition of obscenity to the clearly pornographic, its
approach resembles that suggested by Thurman Arnold shortly after
the Rot& decision. Mr. Arnold posited that per curiam disposition
constituted the wisest approach to the problem. He suggested that the
Court not verbalize any standard, but permit an empirical basis to
develop from its own ad hoc judgements. He hoped that criteria
would emerge from the raw process of decision-making.86
The pitfalls of the other course are exposed by analysis of the con-
ceptual vitality of the Roth-Hicklin standard. While Roth formulated
a test which initially appeared to be a workable and viable tool, more
problems were raised than solved.86 The lexicon of the Roth test, as
well as of the statutes which it applies, includes terms within a defini-
tional circle. 7 Moreover, a sampling of this language confirms the
tendency the Jahoda study noted: "[0] bscenity ... [the test of] is
made identical with the assumed effect." 88
Great promise does not seem to lie in further semantic refinement
of the test for obscenity. In their book Pornography and the Law,""
the Kronhausens attempt to differentiate what they categorized as
"erotic realism" from "pornography." 90 Early in the book their defini-
tional criteria are summarized:
In pornography the main purpose is to stimulate erotic response
in the reader, and that is all. In erotic realism, truthful descrip-
tion of the basic realities of life, as the individual experiences
it, is of the essence.8'
84. Id. at 478.
85. Kalven, supra note 48 at 43-44.
86. Kalven, supra note 48.
87. Authorities cited note 28 supra.
88. Jahoda 106; authorities cited note 28 supra.
89. KEONHAUSEN, PORNoGRAPHY AND THE LAW (1959). The Kronhausen work
has held attraction for many in the field. Lockhart and McClure, supra note 75, at
297.
90. KRONHAUSEN, op. cit. supra note 89, at 18.
91. Ibid. Other reasearchers have made similar distinctions. Lockhart and
McClure, supra note 75, at 296-97. Dr. Margaret Mead:
The material of true pornography is compounded of daydreams themselves,
composed -without regard for any given reader or looker, to stimulate and
titillate. It bears the signature of nonparticipation-of the dreaming
adolescent, the frightened, the impotent, the bored and sated, the senile,
desperately concentrating on unusualness, on drawing that which is not
usually drawn, writing words on a plaster wall, shifting scenes and actors
about, to evoke and feed an impulse that has no object: no object either
because the adolescent is not yet old enough to seek sexual partners or
because the recipient of pornography has lost the precious power of spon-
taneous sexual feeling.
Id. at 296. Note the emphasis on intent of the author as well as the intent of
the reader.
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The subjective element implicit here is sharpened by perusal of
representative passages from both classifications. Obviously analysis
of the purpose of the author requires the employment of criteria
hardly subject to quantification, rationale or perhaps even empirical
analysis.
IV. CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT TECHNIQUES, AN
INADEQUATE RESPONSE TO PUBLIC PRESSURE
As the line between obscane and protected material has become less
clear, an effort to impose strict criminal liability on purveyors of
"obscene" materials has been condemned by the Supreme Court.92
It has been observed that it might be impossible to draft a criminal
ordinance which would be of practical use, yet comply with the re-
quirements developed in Smith v. California.3 This observation has
particular application to "borderline" material. If the book seller
actually read the volume but thought it not obscene, the slippery
character of the test renders prosecution a marginal adventure. So,
too, when prosecution is undertaken of a book wholesaler or large
retailer who turns over hundreds of book titles and thousands of
magazines every month; the problems of proof are insurmountable.2
Contributing further to the general uncertainty, the Court has not
articulated the strength of its scienter requirement, refusing to pass
on any required quantum.9 5
Coupled with these considerations is the fact that most material
circulated in a particular community is not manufactured there.9 6
Hence law enforcement officials in distribution areas are armed with
the least effective tools of enforcement.97 As these barriers of court
92. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
93. Ibid.
94. People v. Richmond County News, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 578, 175 N.E.2d 681,
216 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1961). There the lower court had been unable to find the
requisite scienter for the conviction of a book, newspaper and magazine whole-
sale dealer.
95. Note that Mr. Justice Brennan does not state whether full scienter will be
required, or that the Court will be satisfied with something less as he seems to
imply. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 154 (1959):
We need not and most definitely do not pass today on what sort of mental
element is requisite to a constitutionally permissible prosecution of a book-
seller for carrying an obscene book in stock; whether honest mistake as
to whether its contents in fact constituted obscenity need be an excuse;
whether there might be circumstances under which the State consitutionally
might require that a bookseller investigate further, or might put on him the
burden of explaining why he did not, and what such circumstances might be.
96. 1959 SUBCOMMITTEE RFPORT 7-8.
97. Ibid.
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interpretation and physical location have combined to render the
historic pattern of criminal sanction inadequate to attain the level
of enforcement demanded, development of novel obscenity control
techniques has been spurred. Thus the problem which has assumed
primacy is the sheer physical task of enforcement. Faced with the
economics of modern law enforcement, officials have sought mech-
anisms which minimize man power commitments while producing
long-term compliance by potential vendors.,8 Not unexpectedly, effec-
tiveness has often proved the inverse correlative of constitutional
acceptability.
V. PRIOR RESTRAINT
Writing for a Symposium, "Obscenity and the Arts," Thomas I.
Emerson pointed out:
We are witnessing today a tremendous and ominous expansion
of preventive law in the area of civil liberties. More and more,
our controls are being devised, not as a punishment for actual
wrongful conduct, but with a view to preventing future evils
by a series of restrictions and qualifications that seriously jeopar-
dize freedom of expression."9
The trend which Emerson notes is apparent, and obscenity legislation
is part of it. The Supreme Court has not sanctioned a "talismanic
test" based on a finding of prior restraint,10 but has hedged occasional
approval of such schemes severely.101
98. E.g., State civil prior restraint statutes involving declaratory judgment
or book libel:MAss. ANN. LAWs c. 272 § 28C (1956); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 269.565
(Supp. 1962); Fla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-360, § 1, at 1255. Statutes where injunc-
tions are used: e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.011(7) Supp. 1961); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 26-6306(a) (Supp. 1961); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1510 (Supp. 1961); N.Y.
CODE CRIM. PROC. § 22(a) (Dennis Cum. Supp. 1959); OHio REV. CODE ANN. §
2905.343 (Supp. 1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 3832.1 (Supp. 1961); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. c. 11, § 31-13 (Supp. 1961). Statute authorizing civil seizure of
suspected material: e.g., Mo. Rsv. STAT. §§ 542.380.410 (1959). Note that in the
case of Florida the legislature amended the statute in 1955, 1957, 1959, 1961.
99. Obscenity and the Arts, 20 LAW & CONTEDIP. PROB. 533, 649 (1955).
100. See Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961) which upheld
the validity of a city ordinance requiring the submission of all films to a review
board as a condition for the issuance of an exhibition license. Mr. Justice Clark
sustained the statute indicating that the shape of enforcement of local policy
would not be dictated by the Court. Rather, that the procedure itself would be
subject to review on the basis of its adherence to constitutional principles; Kings-
ley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957) upheld an injunctive process
pendente lite. Both these cases evoked strong dissents. In the case of Times Film,
Mr. Justice Warren termed the procedure a prior restraint and therefore per se
violative of constitutional guarantees as explicated in a list of prior decisions in
which the Court had disapproved of prior restraints. See Times Film Corp. v.
City of Chicago, supra at 50-65. The Chief Justice distinguished the prior
Kingsley Books decision at 64-66.
101. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961) Compare Times
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A. Near v. Minnesota (1931)
In the landmark case of Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson,"°2 the
Court found a Minnesota statute providing for abatement as a public
nuisance of any "malicious, scandalous, and defamatory newspaper,
magazine or other periodical," 103 repugnant to due process stan-
dards.0 4 Publication of the Saturday Press, was enjoined upon a trial
court finding that it was largely devoted to "scadalous" and "defama-
tory matter." The objectionable articles contained charges of corrup-
tion and dishonesty of particular civic officials, and an allegation that
responsible public officials had not performed their duties with respect
to a crime syndicate supposedly under the direction of a Jewish gang-
ster.
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the injunction. The Su-
preme Court observed:
If we cut through mere details of procedure, the operation and
effect of the statute in substance is that public authorities may
bring the owner or publisher of a newspaper or periodical before
a judge upon a charge of conducting a business of publishing
scandalous and defamatory matter-in particular that the matter
consists of charges against public officers of official dereliction-
and unless the owner or publisher is able and disposed to bring
competent evidence to satisfy the judge that the charges are true
and are published with good motives and for justifiable ends, his
newspaper or periodical is suppressed and further publication is
made punishable by contempt. This is of the essence of censor-
ship.10 5
B. Brown v. Kingsley Books, Inc. (1957)
In Brown v. Kingsley Books, Inc., 0 6 the statutory scheme involved
only obscenity. The statute0 7 provided for preliminary restraint of
the sale of particular issues at an ex parte proceeding, and entitled the
owner to final determination of obscenity within two days.
Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, supra note 100, with Joseph Burstyn, Inc.
v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) which brought motion pictures within the ainbit
of protection of the first amendment and struck down a New York statute pro-
viding for licensing of movies by a board of review and authorizing the ban of
"sacrilegious" movies; and Zenith International Film Corp. v. City of Chicago,
291 F.2d 785 (1961) which found invalid a procedure under the ordinance upheld
in Times Film earlier that year because it denied to the petitioner a full and
fair hearing.
102. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
103. Id. at 702.
104. Id. at 716. Mr. Chief Justice Hughes perhaps anticipated Roth as he noted
that obscenity is outside the ambit of first amendment protection.
105. Id. at 713.
106. 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
107. N.Y. CODE CRiM. PRoc. § 22(a) (Dennis Cure. Supp. 1959):
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The complaint charged the appellants with displaying obscene
booklets for sale, fourteen of which were annexed. The court found
the material obscene and ordered that it be destroyed. Any order
pertaining to issues yet to be published was refused.108
After disposing of the objection to the statute on the basis of prior
restraint per se, Mr. Justice Frankfurter applied a pragmatic test to
the statute.109 Following the lead of the New York Court of Appeals, 10
he maintained that the "in terrorem" effect of the procedure varied
little from that of the criminal statutes of California"' and New
The supreme court has jurisdiction to enjoin the sale or distribution of
obscene prints and articles, as hereinafter specified:
1. The district attorney of any county, . . . in which a person, firm or
corporation publishes, sells or distributes or is about to sell or distribute or
has in his possession with intent to sell or distribute or is about to acquire
possession with intent to sell or distribute any book, magazine, pamphlet,...
which is obscene... may maintain an action for an injunction against such
person,... in the supreme court to prevent the sale or further sale or the
distribution... of any book, .. . herein described or described in section
eleven hundred forty-one of the penal law.
2. The person,.... sought to be enjoined shall be entitled to a trial of the
issues within one day after joinder of issues and a decision shall be rendered
by the court within two days of the conclusion of the trial.
3. In the event that a final order or judgment of injunction be entered in
favor of such officer . . . such final order or judgment shall contain a
provision directing the person,.., to surrender to such peace officer as the
court may direct... any of the matter described in paragraph one hereof
and such sheriff shall be directed to seize and destroy the same.
108. Brown v. Kingsley Books, 354 U.S. 436, 438-39 (1957).
109. Id. at 441: "The judicial angle of vision in testing the validity of a statute
... is 'the operation and effect of the statute in substance.'"
110. Brown v. Kingsley Books, 1 N.Y.2d 177, 181, 134 N.E.2d 461, 463, 151
N.Y.S.2d 639, 641, (1956).
111. Brown v. Kingsley Books, 354 U.S. 436, 441-42 (1957). The California
statute had been upheld in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957): CAL. PEN.
CODF ANN. § 311 (West 1955):
Every person who wilfully and lewdly, either: ...
3. Writes, composes, stereotypes, prints, publishes, sells, distributes, keeps
for sale, or exhibits any obscene or indecent writing, paper, or book; or
designs, copies, draws, engraves, paints, or otherwise prepares any obscene
or indecent picture or print; or molds, cuts, casts, or otherwise makes any
obscene or indecent figure; or,
4. Writes, composes, or publishes any notice or advertisement of any such
writing, paper, book, picture, print or figure; or,
5.... [M]aintains any recordings, transcriptions, or mechanical, chemical,
or electrical reproductions... used or intended to be used in producing or re-
producing any lewd or obscene song, ballad, or other words, whether spoken
or sung; or,
6. Sings or speaks any lewd or obscene song, ballad, or other words, in any
public place, or in any place where there are persons present to be annoyed
thereby, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
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York,112 the constitutionality of which he treated as being estab-
lished.113 He pointed out that the operation of the schemes was at a
similar point in time-post-publication, but that unlike the criminal
provisions,14 the civil statute authorized punishment only for violation
of an injunction."5 Justices Douglas, Black and Brennan, dissenting,
objected to the use of the preliminary restraint and also the effective
restraint of circulation throughout the state on the basis of the
original determination of obscenity in a particular locale . 6
C. Motion Pictures-A Case Study
The application of the first and fourteenth amendments to the
cinema provides a capsule view of the Court's treatment of the Near
problem. In 1952 the Court acted to extend constitutional protection
to the movies in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 1 in which New York
authorities censored the showing of The Miracle. The Court struck
down a New York statute providing for the licensing of movies by a
board of review, and authorizing censorship of inter alia "sacrile-
gious" productions." 8 Mr. Justice Clark did not base his decision on
the fact that the statute authorized a system of prior restraint, rather:
This is far from the kind of narrow exception to freedom of ex-
pression which a state may carve out to satisfy the adverse
demands of other interests of society.... New York cannot vest
such unlimited restraining control over motion pictures in a
censor.119
In 1961 in Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 20 the Court
upheld the validity of a city ordinance requiring the submission of a
film to a review board as a condition to issuance of an exhibition
license.121 Mr. Justice Clark, writing for a majority of five, character-
Upon the second ... conviction ... every person so convicted is guilty of a
felony....
112. The New York criminal statute, N.Y. PFN. LAW § 1141 (Supp. 1962), is
very similar and both are to be compared with the New York civil procedure,
supra note 107.
113. Brown v. Kingsley Books, 354 U.S. 436, 441-42 (1957).
114. Due to the meandering line which separates the obscene from the pro-
tected, criminal prosecution may come with little warning. For the effect of the
scienter requirement on this proposition see text and notes 92-95 supra.
115. Brown v. Kingsley Books, 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
116. Id. at 446-47.
117. 343 U.S. 495 (1952). Burstyn disposed of Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230 (1915) in which Mr. Justice MHcKenna had categorized the
movies as business and regulatable aside from any first or fourteenth amendment
considerations.
118. Id. at 497.
119. Id. at 504-05.
120. 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
121. Ibid.
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ized the dispositive issue as whether "the ambit of constitutional pro-
tection includes complete and absolute freedom to exhibit, at least
once, any and every kind of motion picture. 1122 Citing Kingsley
Books,123 the Court found the statute was not void on its face and
failed to reach the question of standards which was characterized as
controlling in Btzrstyn.12' The Court emphasized its wish not to
dictate the selection of particular procedures for the enforcement of
local anti-obscenity policy. 25 However, Mr. Justice Clark intimated
that the standards imposed and the procedure invoked would be sub-
ject to review.126 The result evoked an emphatic dissent by Mr. Chief
Justice Warren, who recalled a line of decisions striking down prior
restraints.127 The Chief Justice felt that such a statute was not
122. Id. at 46.
123. Id. at 48.
124. The standards in the Chicago ordinance, CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODS
§ 155-4 (1931), are analogous to those condemned in Burstyn:
If a picture or series of pictures . . . is immoral or obscene, or portrays
depravity, criminality, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens of any race,
color, creed, or religion and exposes them to contempt, derision, or obloquy,
or tends to produce a breach of the peace or riots, or purports to represent
any hanging, lynching, or burning of any human being....
The Court has considered four other cases in which the standards problem has
proved dispositive: Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of New York,
360 U.S. 684 (1959) ("sexual immorality"); Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Re-
gents of Univ. of New York, 346 U.S. 587 (1954) ("immoral"); Superior Films,
Inc. v. Department of Edue., 346 U.S. 587 (1954) ("harmful"); Gelling v. Texas,
343 U.S. 960 (1952) ("prejudicial to the best interests of the people of said
City"). All of these cases reverse decisions upholding censorship. Indeed,
extensive searching has failed to reveal any instance since 1952 in which the
Court has upheld an instance of actual movie censorship.
125. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 50 (1961).
126. Ibid.
127. Id. at 51. The Chief Justice found particular disfavor with the aspect of
the license which allowed a censor to review the movie as a substitute for a court
of law. Id. at 68. He detailed specific instances of censorship of particular
portions of movies, particularly under the Chicago ordinance, in which lines and
scenes were excised from a variety of films, some of which had distinguished
reputations. Id. at 69-73. Instances of articulation of the standards of the
censors are documented: "A police sergeant attached to the censor board explained,
'Coarse language or anything that would be derogatory to the government-
propaganda' is ruled out of foreign films. 'Nothing pink or red is allowed,' he
added.... A member of the Chicago censor board explained that she rejected
a film because 'it was immoral, corrupt, indecent, against my ... religious prin-
ciples.... The police sergeant in charge of the censor unit has said: 'Children
should be allowed to see any movie that plays in Chicago. If a picture is objec-
tionable for a child, it is objectionable period.' Id. at 72. It is also noted that
between the decision in Burstyr and the filing of the petition of certiorari in this
case, when the exhibitor has elected to appeal, not once has the court elected to
uphold the application of the procedure. Id. at 72-73.
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susceptible to constitutional administration. He feared that in the
face of such potentially arbitrary authority, commercial interests
would submit to the censor's editing rather than litigate.128 As Mr.
Justice Clark intimated, the federal courts reviewed a procedure
under the same ordinance that very year, and as the Chief Justice
feared, found it violative of the exhibitor's rights.129
The doctrine distilled from Near is that previous restraint does not
per se invalidate a statutory scheme. However, any prior restraint
must be placed within that "exceptional" category Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes mentioned in Near.130 Further, the emphasis has been placed
on the limitations on the "exceptional" area and the subtleties in-
volved in identifying that material which may be regulated.' 3' In the
Times Film case the Court summarized its attitude toward systems
of prior restraint:
[I]n Kingsley Books,... after characterizing Near... as "one
of the landmark opinions" in its area, we took notice that Near
"left no doubts that 'Liberty of speech, and of the press, is also
not an absolute right ... the protection even as to previous re-
straint is not absolutely unlimited.' . . . The judicial angle of
vision," we said there, "in testing the validity of a statute...
is 'the operation and effect of the statute in substance.' 1"132
It might have added that there is not a single instance since Burstyn 33
in which application of a movie censorship scheme has been sustained
before the Supreme Court. 13 4
128. Id. at 74-75:
His inclination may well be simply to capitulate rather than initiate a
lengthy and costly litigation.... It is axiomatic that the stroke of a censor's
pen or the cut of his scissors will be a less contemplated decision than will
be the prosecutor's determination to prepare a criminal indictment.
129. Zenith Int'l Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 291 F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1961).
130. "Nor has it been suggested that all previous restraints on speech are
invalid. On the contrary, In Near v. Minnesota... Chief Justice Hughes,
in discussing the classic legal statements concerning the immunity of the
press from censorship, observed that the principle forbidding previous re
straint 'is stated too broadly, if every such restraint is deemed to be pro-
hibited.... [T]he protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutely
unlimited. But the limitation has been recognized only in exceptional cases.'"
Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 47 (1961). "In the light of the
First Amendment's history and of the Near decision, the State has a heavy
burden to demonstrate that the limitation challenged here presents such an
exceptional case." Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 504 (1952). In
fact, with regard to instances of movie censorship, since 1952 no state has been
able to sustain an actual application of its statute before the Court.
131. Cases cited note 124 supra.
132. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 48-49 (1961).
133. 1952.
134. A search has not revealed any decision upholding the application of such
a statute since that time either.
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VI. SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND FREE SPEECH: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY SETTING
A. The Fourth Amendment
The fourth amendment'35 which, under Mapp v. Ohio, is applicable
to all searches and seizures,1 3 states: "[N] o Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or Affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.' ' 3 Assuming that Mapp envisions that at least the broad
basis of federal search warrant standards theretofore developed will
be applied to the states, 3 8 the constitutional requirements surrounding
all search warrants are well stated in Mai'ron v. United States.3 ' The
case holds that the Constitution requires search warrants to par-
ticularly describe the thing to be seized and therefore the property
must be described with such certainty that it is identifiable. 140
B. The Missouri Statutory Scheme
The Missouri legislature sought to attack the obscenity problem
with a civil obscenity law 4 1 which provided for search and seizure
135. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
136. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The Court held that the Weeks federal exclusionary
rule would be applicable in the state courts under the right of privacy guaranteed
in the fourth amendment as enforceable against the states by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.
137. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
138. Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No-Man's Land in the Criminal Law, 49
CALm. L. Rsv. 474, 503 (1961) : "It is difficult to believe that the many minor
as well as major irrationalities in the law of search and seizure have suddenly
achieved constitutional dimension. It is possible that in future cases the Supreme
Court will more explicitly recognize the great virtue of federalism in approaching
these problems and apply the exclusionary rules to the states only when a serious
or intentional breach of the right of privacy occurs. It remains, however, for
future litigation to resolve this point."
Obviously we are not here concerned with the exclusionary rule as in Mapp
but with some undefined sanction, probably outright reversal, against proceedings
resting on search and seizure violative of the right of privacy.
139. 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
140. Ibid.
141. Mo. Ray. STAT. § 542.380 (1959):
Upon complaint being made, on oath, in writing, to any officer authorized
to issue process for the apprehension of offenders, that any of the property
or articles herein named are kept within the county of such officer, if he
shall be satisfied that there is reasonable ground for such complaint, shall
issue a warrant to the sheriff or any constable of the county, directing him
to search for and seize any of the following property or articles:
1. [list of gambling materials]
2. Any of the following articles, kept for the purpose of being sold, pub-
lished, exhibited, given away or otherwise distributed or circulated, viz.,
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of suspected materials. It authorized issuance of a search warrant on
the complaint of a local law enforcement officer in an ex pairte pro-
ceeding. The complaint had to be supported by the officer's oath of
personal knowledge, or had to display "evidential facts" from which
the judge or magistrate could determine probable cause.14 2 There were
provisions for a hearing within five to twenty days after the seizure,143
obscene, lewd, licentious, indecent or lascivious books, pamphlets, ballads,
papers, drawings, lithographs, engravings, pictures, models, casts, prints
or other articles or publications of an indecent immoral or scandalous
character, or any letters, handbills, cards, circulars, books, pamphlets or
advertisements or notices of any kind giving information, directly or indi-
rectly, when, where, how or of whom any such things can be obtained....
Mo. REV. STAT. § 542.400 (1959):
The judge or magistrate issuing the warrant shall set a day, not less than
five days nor more than twenty days after the date of such service and
seizure, for determining whether such property is the kind of property
mentioned in 542.380, and shall order the officer having such property in
charge to retain possession of the same until after such hearing. Written
notice of the date and place of such hearing shall be given, at least five days
before such a date, by posting a copy of such notice.., upon the premises
in which such property was seized, and by delivering a copy . . . to any
person claiming an interest... ,whose name may be known to the person
making the complaint or to the officer issuing or serving such warrant....
Mo. RE V. STAT. § 542.410 (1959):
The owner or owners of such property may appear at such hearing and
defend against the charges as to the nature and use of the property so
seized, and such judge or magistrate shall determine, from the evidence
produced at such hearing, whether the property is the kind of property
mentioned in section 542.380.
Mo. SuP. CT. (CRIM.) R. 33.01:
(a) If a complaint in writing be filed with the judge or magistrate of any
court having original jurisdiction to try criminal offenses stating that
personal property. . . . IT]he seizure of which under search warrant is
. .. authorized by... statute.., is being held or kept in any place . . .
within the territorial jurisdiction . . . and if such complaint be verified
by oath or affirmation of the complainant and states such facts positively and
not upon information or belief; or if the same be supported by written
affidavits ... stating evidential facts from which such judge or magistrate
determines the existence of probable cause, then such judge or magistrate
shall issue a search warrant directed to any peace officer commanding him
to search the place... and to seize and bring before such judge or magis-
trate the personal property therein described.
(b) The complainant [sic] and the warrant issued thereon must contain a
description of the personal property to be searched for and seized and a
description of the place . . . in sufficient detail . . . to enable the officer
serving the warrant to readily ascertain and identify the same.
142. Ibid.
143. Statutes cited note 141 supra.
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but no statutory time limit was imposed within which the judge was
required to render his decision.' 4
VII. MARCUS V. SEARCH WARRANT
Under the Missouri civil obscenity law, police made purchases of
"girlie" magazines at several newsstands, and using their purchases
as support for the complaint, procured a warrant which described the
material to be seized in the generic terms of the statute (obscene,
etc.). A search was instituted and 11,000 pieces of material, repre-
senting some 280 separate issues, were seized. The adjudication of
the issue of obscenity, which resulted in return of 180 of the issues
and destruction of the remainder, 45 was not completed until two
months after the seizure.
The Missouri Supreme Court upheld the trial court ruling, com-
paring the Missouri procedure to that sustained by the United States
Supreme Court in Kingsley Books, three years earlier."" However,
on review, the United States Supreme Court found the procedure
violative of the fourteenth amendment.147 The Court called attention
to the absence of a judicial determination of obscenity prior to the
issuance of the warrant, the establishment by police officers of the
operative criteria for seizure and the length of time which protected
material was withheld from the public.' 48 Mr. Justice Brennan re-
flected a unanimous Court's traditional concern with procedure in
prior restraint cases, and differentiated the careful and speedy New
York procedure in Kingsley Books from that in Marcus.14' He pointed
out that the Missouri statute classified obscene literature with
gambling, contraband and other paraphernalia for the purposes of
search and seizure,150 thereby ignoring the requirement of "discrimi-
nating tools" in appreciation of the "finely drawn line" between the
protected and the obscene.'51
Initially, the New York procedure provided a preliminary judicial
hearing on the issue of obscenity,152 whereas in the Missouri pro-
cedure the warrant was issued on the basis of the belief of the police
officer, buttressed by a general sample of the material for which the
warrant was asked.15 3 The preliminary suppression in Kingsley was
144. Ibid.
145. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 722-24 (1961).
146. Search Warrant v. Marcus, 334 S.W.2d 119 (Mo. 1960).
147. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 733 (1961).
148. Id. at 731-38.
149. Id. at 731-38.
150. Id. at 730-31.
151. Id. at 731.
152. Statutes cited note 107 supra.
153. See text accompanying note 145 supra.
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under the control of a responsible judicial official; whereas in Marcus,
substantive control was lodged in the hands of the police officer. In
New York, the procedure offered prompt, final determination on the
issue of obscenity, thereby minimizing suppression of material in the
protected class. 5 4 In Missouri, the hearing and final determination
were dragged out for two months, because the judge was under no
statutory mandate to announce his decision promptly. 5
Significantly, the Court did not rely on its extension of the pro-
tection of the fourth amendment to the states in Mapp v. Ohio,'" as
would concurring Justices Black and Douglas.157 Rather, the pro-
cedure for differentiating the obscene from the protected-the appli-
cation of the test announced in Roth-was found wanting under the
fourteenth amendment because prompt protection was not afforded
material which was not obscene. 58 Operative criteria which the court
has applied in Marcus would seem to require prior judicial determina-
tion of obscenity of particular matter, seizure only of that matter,
and final, prompt, judicial and adversary determination of obscenity.
In the opinion, however, the Court refused either to indicate its
assessment of the relationship of the first and fourteenth amend-
ments"59 or to pass on the question of the validity of the Missouri
statutory scheme on its face.8 0
154. Statute cited note 107 supra.
155. See text accompanying note 145 supra.
156. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
157. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 738-39 (1961).
158. Id. at 731. The court indicated its appreciation of the application of
search and seizure as a prior restraint. Id. at 725-26:
Governmental use of the power of search and seizure as an adjunct to a
system for the suppression of objectionable publications is not new. His-
torically the struggle for freedom of speech and press in England was
bound up with the issue of search and seizure power. . . . [T]he Star
Chamber ... in 1586 . . . [decreed] "That it shall be lawful for the War-
dens of the said Company [The Stationers' Company which was incorpo-
rated in 1557 to implement the Tudor licensing system] for the time being
or any two of the said Company thereto deputed by the said Wardens, to
make search in all workhouses, shops, warehouses of printers, book sellers,
bookbinders, or where they shall have reasonable cause of suspicion, and all
books [etc.] ... contrary to ... these present Ordinances to stay and take
to her Majesty's use . . . ." Books thus seized were taken to Stationers'
Hall where they were inspected by ecclesiastical officers, who decided whether
they should be burnt.
159. Id. at 723. When Mr. Justice Brennan said "[I]n the context of the
protections for free speech and press assured against state abridgement by the
Fourteenth Amendment," as in Roth he did not articulate the due process clause
as invoking the protection of the first amendment as to state action, but walked
a tightrope.
160. Id. at 723 n.9.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1962/iss4/3
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
VIII. THE PROBLEM IN LOUISIANA AND CALIFORNIA
Two lower court cases preceding Marcus by a few months presented
similar questions. In re Louisiana News Co.10' involved a search
similar to that in Marcus; however, local authorities based their action
on a criminal obscenity statute which lacked explicit search and
seizure powers.162 A federal district court invalidated the action under
the fourteenth amendment on the grounds that the procedure involved
an improper application of the Roth test. The police officers, who
again made an ad hoc determination of obscenity, testified that the
criterion which they employed was the showing of "bare breasts" and
"buttocks." 163 The use of such criteria illustrates the basis of the
Supreme Court's condemnation in Marcus of police officer selection
of suspected material.
In the other case, Aday v. Superior Court,20 4 the California Supreme
Court upheld procedure in which copies of two books02 were seized
under a warrant (granted in an ex raorte hearing) naming them ob-
scene. The statutes provided for an adversary hearing on probable
cause on return of the warrant.1 6 In a mandamus action 07 contesting
161. 187 F. Supp. 241 (1960).
162. This case involved mass seizures of materials with the criteria for ob-
scenity as applied by the searching officers the showing of "bare breasts and
buttocks." The court held the procedure was a violation of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment on the grounds of the relevance of the test
as applied by the officers. The constitutional issues posed by the entire pro-
cedure were not considered. A state action involving those questions was pend-
ing which the federal court was not asked to stay. (This must have been dropped
or disposed of at the trial level as nowhere in the appropriate source material
is such a case reported.) The officers acted under color of the Louisiana
criminal obscenity law. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:106 (1951):
Obscenity is the intentional: ...
(2) Production, sale, exhibition, possession with intention to display, ex-
hibit, or sell, or the advertisement of, any obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or
sexually indecent print, picture, motion picture, written composition, model,
instrument, contrivance or thing of whatsoever description:
or ...
Whoever commits the crime of obscenity shall be ....
163. In re Louisiana News Co., 187 F. Supp. 241 (E.D. La. 1960).
164. 55 Cal. App. 2d 789, 362 P.2d 47 (1961).
165. Id. at 792, 362 P.2d at 49; SEX Li OF A COP; JOY KILLR.
166. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1539, 1540 (West 1955).
167. Statute cited note 166 supra. Ordinarily mandamus is limited to the
instance where there has been gross abuse of administrative discretion or to
compel the performance of a ministerial duty. HIGH, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL
REMEDIES § 24 (2d ed. 1884); STATSON & COOPER, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS
ON ADmINISTRATIVE TRIIUNALS 578-79 (3d ed. 1957); 55 C.J.S. Mandamus § 63
(1948). However, in California mandamus has undergone considerable expansion.
See Kleps, Certiorarified Mandamus: Court Review of California Administrative
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the seizure, the court answered constitutional objections by main-
taining that prompt, final determination of obscenity might be ob-
tained in a criminal trial or a mandamus proceeding. 8 While the
promptness of the criminal trial would not satisfy the requirements
developed in Kingsley and Marcus, the relief afforded under Cali-
fornia's distinctive use of mandamus 19 would appear to meet Mr.
Justice Brennan's criteria or prompt, final determination.1'7 0
IX. ANALYSIS: SEARCH AND SEIZURE AS PRIOR RESTRAINT
While search warrants must describe the object to be seized with
particularity, this requirement does not obviate the use of a generic
term such as "gambling devices."'7' If protected material were readily
Decisions 1939-40, 2 STAN. L. REV. 285 (1950). The CAL. CIV. PROC. ANN. §§ 1086-
87, 1090, 1094.5 (Deering 1959); § 1086 provides that the writ issue in all cases
where a plain, adequate, and speedy remedy is not available at law; § 1087 pro-
vides that the writ may be preemptory or alternative in form; § 1090 enables
the court to order a jury trial in cases where essential questions of fact arise; §
1094.5 provides for extensive review of administrative decision making. In
the Aday case the court cites three cases as support for the proposition that
mandamus affords a remedy for the prompt final determination of obscenity:
Stern v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. App. 2d 772, 780, 174 P.2d 34 (1946); Atlas
Finance Corp. v. Kenny, 68 Cal. App. 2d 504, 157 P.2d 401 (1945); People v.
Phillips, 163 Cal. App. 2d 541, 329 P.2d 621 (1958). These appear to deal with,
or their dicta concern, the rights of the defendant to controvert the warrant
under the same provisions as employed in Aday (defect in the warrant), or they
do not refer to authority for a separate action of mandamus for final determina-
tion. However, the sense of the provisions of the California code seems to support
the proposition which the supreme court of that state advanced in Aday. In addi-
tion, that court's announcement would appear to constitute considerable authority
for the proposition.
168. Aday v. Superior Court, 55 Cal. App. 2d 789, 799, 362 P.2d 47, 53-54
(1961):
The seizure of all copies of an allegedly obscene book is not invalid if made
on probable cause and if the owner of the book has adequate remedies by
which to litigate the issue of obscenity. Where, as here, the seizure occurs
under a warrant, an ex parte determination of the issue of obscenity, so
far as probable cause is concerned, has taken place before issuance of the
warrant, and immediately after the seizure determination of the issue to
that extent can be obtained in adversary proceedings by controverting the
warrant under sections 1539 and 1540 of the Penal Code. In the event the
owner is unsuccessful in that proceeding, a final determination as to ob-
scenity will be had in the criminal action which will ordinarily follow within
a reasonable time, or other remedies such as a mandamus will be available
to secure the return of the property.
169. See discussion note 167 supra.
170. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 737-38 (1961).
171. Allen v. Holbrook, 103 Utah 319, 334, 135, P.2d 242, 249 (1943), modified
on other grounds, 103 Utah 599, 139 P.2d 233 (1943). "If the goods are contra-
band or of such a character or nature as to be unlawful or illicit under the
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identifiable under the Court's test, a generic term would suffice in the
obscenity cases also, under the rule that contraband or unlawful or
illicit goods require but a general description.72 What is required is
judicial control over the search. Varon, in his book Searches and
Seizures, elucidates this in a manner particularly applicable here:
The duty of the executing police officer is purely an administra-
tive act and he is required to implicitly obey the command of the
search warrant as to the place to be searched and the property
seized. Were he to exercise any discretion in the execution and
enforcement of the search warrant, such action may constitute
a departure from the command of the warrant, which can render
the same susceptible to attack . . . rigid observance of the de-
scription requirements of search warrants ... divest the police
officers of any discretion in the search.1 73
However, the Marcus Court did not discuss the subtleties of search
and seizure requirements. Rather the requirements which were
developed bore closer relation to those standards formulated in
Kingsley Books and Near. The problem posed by the obscenity test
caused the Missouri procedure, which the Court indicated would be
acceptable if directed against anything but speech,27 4 to fail the due
process test. In the Marcus opinion Mr. Justice Brennan quoted
Speiser v. Randall :15 "The separation of legitimate from illegitimate
speech calls for... sensitive tools .... ,,17 In itself, the position which
the Court took respecting the sophistication required to make en-
forcement decisions indicates the shakiness of the Roth-Manual test
as an effective tool for classification. It also indicates the Court's
concept of search-seizure procedures as a form of prior restraint.
Treatment of the Marcus situation in this manner permitted the
Court to dictate an entire range of standards which flow naturally
from the doctrines developed in the line of cases beginning with
Near.
The answer may be couched in fourth-fourteenth amendment
terms, "Since the state has used a general warrant in this case in
violation of the prohibitions of the fourth and fourteenth amend-
ments .... ,,17 Such analysis, however, does not easily lend itself to
development of the requirements of prompt judicial determination or
of prior judicial determination, both of which are stronger than the
circumstances surrounding it, a general description of the goods seems to be
sufficient... [G]ambling devices....
172. Ibid.
173. 1 VARON, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 338-39 (1961).
174. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 730-31 (1961).
175. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
176. Id. at 525.
177. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 738-39 (1961).
Washington University Open Scholarship
OBSCENITY REGULATION
"probable cause" required in search warrant cases. Another possible
reason for the rejection of this approach is that by reviewing on the
basis of search-seizure standards, the core issue of censorship would
not be reached. The Mapp opinion did not specify the standards which
would be applicable to state search-seizure cases,178 a fact which
might mean that a fourth amendment basis for these cases would
prove a sandy foundation indeed.
However, the demise of the Marcus procedure is most clearly ex-
plained in terms of overly efficient realization of enforcement goals.
In excusing the Kingsley Books incursion into the closely guarded
realm of approved prior restraint, the Court found that the deterrent
effect of the civil procedure, in terms of producing informal restraints
on the circulation of protected material, was less than that of the
typical criminal statute.1 7 9 In Times Film, the particular objection
which the dissent posed to the majority was this deterrent effect."8"
The Missouri procedure simply represented a devastatingly effective
way to employ search and seizure as prior restraint. Extensive ap-
plication of the statute would serve well the requirements of efficient
police work; for what large distributor would carry even remotely
questionable material in the face of the state's ability to withhold it
from the market for two months? Further completing the analogy
to prior restraint as evidenced in the movie cases is the fact that the
Court refused to declare the Missouri statutory scheme beyond the
constitutional pale'81 per se, contenting itself with the treatment of
a particular application.
X. THE POSTAL DEPARTMENT:1812 A POSSIBLE FIELD
FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE MARCUS STANDARDS
The United States Post Office Department, through the criminal
provisions of the Postal Obscenity Law83 and the recently amended
civil statute authorizing the suspension of mail privileges of those
178. See authorities cited note 138 supra.
179. Brown v. Kingsley Books, 354 U.S. 436, 442 (1957).
180. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 74-75 (1961):
His inclination may well be simply to capitulate rather than initiate a
lengthy and costly litigation.... It is axiomatic that the stroke of a censor's
pen or the cut of his scissors will be a less contemplated decision than will
be the prosecutor's determination to prepare a criminal indictment.
181. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 723 n.9 (1961).
182. For a discussion in depth of the postal problem with emphasis on actual
operational techniques and historical development, PAUL & SCHWARTZ, FEDERAL
CENSORSHIP: OBSCENITY IN THE MAIL (1961).
183. Postal Obscenity Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461-65 (1958):
Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile article, matter,
thing, device, or substance....
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dealing in obscenity, 84 has made wide use of search and seizure to re-
Is declared to be nonmailable matter and shall not be conveyed in the
mails or delivered from any post office or by any letter carrier....
Whoever knowingly uses the mails....
§ 1462 prohibits the importation or transportation of obscene matters, § 1463
the mailing of indecent matter on wrappers or envelopes, § 1464 the broad-
casting of obscene language and § 1465 the transportation of obscene matters
for sale or distribution. Attached to these prohibitions is a penal provision.
This is the successor of a penal statute which was enacted in 1873 at the behest
of Anthony Comstock, noted advocate of the application of Victorian Standards
of morality through legislation. Apparently the statute was passed with no
consideration by the Congress of the possibilities of administrative censorship
which postal authorities have since assumed under its provisions. This is not
an implication that the present procedure is not sanctioned by congressional
reinactment and silence over a long period of time. However, for such an
opinion, Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 519 (1962); see Paul &
Schwartz, Obscenity in the Mails: A Comment on Some Problems of Federal
Censorship, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 214, 217-18 nn.9 & 12 (1957).
184. Postal Obscenity Law, 39 U.S.C. § 4006 (1962):
Upon evidence satisfactory to the Postmaster General that a person is
obtaining or attempting to obtain remittances of money or property of any
kind through the mail for an obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy, or
vile article, matter, thing, device, or substance, or is depositing or causing
to be deposited in the United States mail information as to where, how,
or from whom the same may be obtained, the Postmaster General may-
(1) Direct postmasters at the office at which registered letters or other
letters or mail arrive, addressed to such a person or his representative, to
return the registered letters or other letters or mail to the sender marked
"Unlawful"; and
(2) Forbid the payment by a postmaster to such a person or his representa-
tive of any money order or postal note drawn to the order of either and pro-
vide for the return to the remitters of the sums named in the money orders
or postal notes.
Postal Obscenity Law, 74 Stat. 655 (1960) (now Postal Obscenity Law, 39 U.S.C.
§ 4007 (1962)). -
(a) When the Postmaster General determines during proceedings before
him that in the administration of section 4006 of this title such action is
necessary to the effective enforcement of the section, he may enter an
interim order directing that mail addressed to any person be detained by
the postmaster at the post office of delivery for twenty days from the effec-
tive date of the order. Notice of the order ... together with a copy of this
section and section 4006 . . . shall be sent forth with by registered or
certified mail.... An order for the detention of mail addressed to a person
expires at the end of twenty days... unless the Postmaster General files,
prior to the expiration of the . . . period, a petition in the United States
district court for the district in which the post office in which the mail is
detained is situated, and obtains an order that mail . . . be detained for
such further periods as the court determines. Notice of the filing ... shall
be given forthwith . . . to the person . . . and the person shall have five
days... to appear and show cause why the order should not issue.... An
appeal from the order of the court is allowable as in civil cases. An order
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strict the circulation of obscene literature.18 5 Departmental censor-
ship has been studied by lower courts from time to time, 86 but prior
to 1962 its procedures had escaped Supreme Court view.81B
In a study of postal practices up to the early 1950's, Edward de
Grazia, counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union in several
of the Postmaster General or of the district court, under this section, may be
dissolved by that court at any time for cause, including failure to conduct
expiditously the proceedings instituted against the person before the Post-
master General with respect to section 4006 of this title .... Under an
order herein authorized.., a person's mail is detained ... that person may
examine the mail and receive such mail as clearly is not connected with the
alleged unlawful activity.
(b) Action by the Postmaster General in issuing the interim order pro-
vided for herein and petitioning for a continuance of an order under this
section, is not subject to chapter 19 of title 5.
(c) This section does not apply to mail addressed to publishers of pub-
lications which have entry as second-class matter, or to mail addressed to
agents of those publishers.
Postal Obscenity Law, 39 U.S.C. § 4007 (1962):
(a) In preparation for or during the pendency of procedures under
sections 4005 and 4006 of this title, the United States district court in the
district in which the defendant receives his mail shall, upon application
therefor by the Postmaster General and upon a showing of probable cause
to believe the statute is being violated, enter a temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction ... directing the detention of the defendant's
incoming mail.., pending the conclusion of the statutory proceedings and
any appeal therefrom....
It is to be noted that Pub. L. 86-682 (74 Stat. 655) and Pub. L. 86-673 (73 Stat.
553) are in conflict and the latter has awaited its recent integration into title
39 in the perfecting bill. Although Pub. L. 86-673 was passed before the codifica-
tion of title 39, it was passed after the cutoff date on the recodification so it is
good law. Department regulations prior to the enactment of the perfecting bill
have reflected the provisions in Pub. L. 86-673, 26 Fed. Reg. 12772 (1961) amend-
ing 39 C.F.R. § 201.1-.31 (Supp. 1961).
185. Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962). In Manual the
Court refused to decide what law is in force. Paul & Schwartz, Obscenity in the
Mails: A comment on Some Problems of Federal Censorship, 106 U. PA. L. R-y.
214 (1957), provides a preliminary survey of the entire problem as an interim
report on a broader study. Obscenity and the Arts, 20 LAw AND CONTEMP. PROB.
533, 608 (1955).
186. See, e.g., Summerfield v. Sunshine Book Co., 221 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1954),
cert. denied 349 U.S. 921 (1955); Stanard v. Olesen, 347 U.S. 609 (1954)(Douglas as Circuit Justice); Walker v. Popenoe, 149 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1945);
Big Table, Inc. v. Schroeder, 186 F. Supp. 254 (N.D. Ill. 1960); see authorities
cited note 185 supra.
187. Stanard v. Olesen, 347 U.S. 609 (1954) (Douglas as Circuit Justice);
Big Table, Inc. v. Schroeder, 186 F. Supp. 254, 258 n.5 (1960). Manual Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962). The majority failed to reach the question
of the validity of the procedure, however, Mr. Justice Brennan and three col-
leagues concurring separately viewed the Post Office procedure as unconstitutional.
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censorship cases, 88 detailed the department's methods of obscenity
control.189 He found that under the criminal statute the department
authorized any postal official to seize matter 90 and to submit it to the
Solicitor of the Post Office, who determined its obscenity. Material
found free from obscenity was placed back in the mail and nothing
was said. If, however, the Solicitor determined that the material was
non-mailable, the sender was notified that he had 15 days to show
cause why it should not be destroyed. 91 The department has not
regularly followed the restriction imposed in Walker v. Popenoe,92
in which the Court held that the department must carry and deliver
mail until it is determined to be obscene.19 3
In addition to the power which the department had exercised under
that statute, Congress, in 1950, granted more authority for censor-
ship.9 4 As amended in 1960,195 the Postal Obscenity Law authorized
188. Obscenity and the Arts, supra note 185.
189. Ibid.
190. Note that, except for first class mail, any letter carrier or mail clerk may
open mail. Id. at 609.
191. Ibid.
192. 149 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1945); See Stanard v. Olesen, 347 U.S. 609
(1954) (Douglas as Circuit Justice) in which there was an interim order by the
Postmaster General impounding the petitioner's mail pending administrative
determination of obscenity; Big Table, Inc. v. Schroeder, 186 F. Supp. 254, 256
n.1 (N.D. Ill. 1960) where there was a seizure and a considerable lapse of time
between notice, hearing and final adjudication. Obscenity and the Arts, supra
note 185, at 610.
193. Walker v. Popenoe, 149 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1945). This action involved
a pamphlet, "Preparing for Marriage," which the Postmaster excluded from the
mails. The appellant was the author and publisher. The pamphlet contained
certain information regarding the physical and emotional aspects of marriage.
The court regarded the procedure of the Postmaster General in the following
light:
In making the determination whether any publication is obscene the Post-
master General necessarily passes on a question involving the fundamental
liberty of a citizen. This is a judicial and not an executive function. It
must be excercised according to the ideas of due process implicit in the
Fifth Amendment .... Appellees have been prevented for a long period of
time from mailing a publication which we now find contains nothing offensive
to current standards of public decency. A full hearing is the minimum
protection required by due process to prevent that kind of injury.
Id. at 513-14. See discussion note 202, 204 infra.
194. Obscenity and the Arts, supra note 185, at 611.
195. Statute cited note 184 supra. The amendments added to the 1950 law the
provisions for the department impounding order and departmental determination
of obscenity in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act, 39 U.S.C. § 259a, 259b (1950). See also Sunshine Book Co. v.
Summerfield, 249 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1957), in which a post office procedure
including an interim impounding order was upheld. However, this decision was
summarily reversed, 355 U.S. 372 (1957) (per curiam), casting doubt on the
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the department to issue a twenty day impounding order (subject to ex-
tension by a United States district court), pending an administrative
determination concerning the suspect's dealing in obscenity. The
statute provided for return of payment or orders to the sender
stamped "unlawful" and prevented payment of postal money orders
or notes where the Postmaster General had "satisfactory evidence"
that the suspect was attempting to obtain payment for obscenity, or
was sending information by mail concerning the procuring of the
same. 96 Under this act the department set up rules to insure full and
fair hearings,9 7 but there have been efforts98 which were successful
in the 1960 amendments'99 to avoid the statutory requirements em-
bodied in the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946.200 A further
example of the department's failure to follow court decisions is pro-
vided in the aftermath of Summerfield v. Sunshine Book Co., 20° which
condemned both blanket stop orders202 and stop orders going to
material yet unpublished.203 The department contemplated the use of
the blanket orders as late as 1955.204
entire lower court opinion. The Court did not indicate the objection. The Popenoe
case and the effect of Summerfield in the court of appeals, is extensively treated
in PAUL & SCHWARTZ, op. cit. supra, note 185, at 244-48.
196. Statute cited note 184 supra.
197. 26 Fed. Reg. 11654 (1961), amending 39 C.F.R. § 201.1-.31 (Supp. 1961).
198. Obscenity and the Arts, supra, note 185, at 613.
199. Statute cited note 184 supra.
200. Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1958).
"One of the really important events in the development of administrative law in
the United States has been the enactment by Congress of the Administrative
Procedure Act of 1946-an act designed to prescribe in statutory form certain
basic essentials of fairness and equity in the administrative relations between
government and its citizens." STATSON & COOPER, THE LAW OF ADMINISTRATIVE
TRIBUNALS 81 (3d ed. 1957).
201. 221 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
202. Id. at 47: "They [department stop orders] must be confined to materials
already published, and duly found unlawful." Note that this language would
seem to support the proposition in Walker v. Popenoe, 149 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir.
1945).
203. Ibid.
204. Obscenity and the Arts, supra note 185, at 613-14:
The Associate Solicitor for the Post Office Department already seems of a
mind to ignore it [Summerfield] as it did Walker v. Popenoe. The Associate
Solicitor for the Post Office Department recently was asked: "If you were
to find that the Chevrolet Division of General Motors Corp. had posted an
obscene book, could you, as you construe your existing powers, issue an
order to stop all mail sent to the Chevrolet Division? Yes."
(Author's emphasis.) See PAUL & ScHwARTz, op. cit. supra, note 185, at 248-50
for a discussion of the practical difficulties of the use of the stop order within
the dictates of the Sunshine Book Co. case. For recognition by commercial inter-
ests that the Post Office Department is operationally in disregard of court de-
cisions, see authorities cited note 78 supra.
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In 1959 the post office department secured passage of a bill in the
House which would have authorized a forty-five day interim mail bloc
on incoming mail and would have provided an altered appeal proce-
dure from department obscenity determinations.2 0 The Justice De-
partment, however, interposed objections to the procedure, so the
House bill was amended by the Senate °0 and was enacted into law in
1960.207 The provisions of this act abandoned department-ordered
twenty or forty-five day interim mail blocs, and substituted an in-
definite bloc obtained by preliminary injunction issued in a federal
district court on the Postmaster's application, supported by a showing
of probable cause of violation of the statute. The statutory language
does not indicate whether blanket blocs are envisioned.
Both of these administrative systems of restraint go further down
the road of censorship than have any of the court-administered pro-
cedures heretofore examined. As a result of the broad nature
of the statutes,2° the inapplicability of the Administrative Procedure
Act of 1946,209 and the department's apparent disregard of restric-
tions imposed by the lower federal courts, 210 the practical exercise of
the department's power has been limited only by the regulations the
department itself has promulgated.211
Postal obscenity regulation, either in the form of the refusal to
forward under Section 1461 or the mail bloc under the Postal Oscenity
Law, provides an efficient weapon in the hands of the obscenity regu-
lator. The sanctions are severe; there is no lag in their imposition;
they are enforced without regard to state boundaries; and they may
be imposed as a result of an administrative determination of obscenity
which is not subject to review until long after the economic effects
have taken place. The departures from established practice and the
existence of potentially arbitrary power have brought increasing in-
dications that a full-scale review of postal obscenity practice is not
far off. Mr. Justice Douglas suggested, as early as 1954, that possibly
the postal procedure would amount to a prior restraint and would
be subject to limitations embodied in the first, fifth and sixth amend-
ments.212 Early in 1962, four members of the Court wished to turn
205. 2 U.S. CODE CONGRESSIONAL AND ADmiINISTRATIVE NEWs, 86th Cong. 2d
Sess. 3246 (1960) (legislative history).
206. Id. at 3246-47.
207. 74 Stat. 533 (1960), 39 U.S.C. § 4007 (1962).
208. Statutes cited notes 183-84 supra.
209. Statute cited note 192 supra.
210. Authorities cited notes 192, 193, 202, 204 supra; Obscenity and the Arts,
supra note 185, at 608-14.
211. 26 Fed. Reg. 11654 (1961).
212. Stanard v. Olesen, 347 U.S. 609 (Douglas as Circuit Justice):
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the consideration of the obscenity test in Manual Enterprises, Inc. v.
Day213 into a full scale review of the postal procedure. A separate con-
curring opinion written by Mr. Justice Brennan and signed by three
of his colleagues, while attacking directly the authority assumed by
the Postmaster under Section 1461,214 indicated a need to measure the
postal procedure against the constitutional standards announced in
Marcus :21
We risk erosion of First Amendment liberties unless we train
our vigilance upon the methods whereby obscenity is condemned
no less than upon the standards whereby it is judged. 16
Mr. Justice Brennan called attention to several aspects of the
current practice involved in the Manual fact situation, indicating his
view of their questionable constitutional basis:
Questions of procedural safeguards loom large in the wake of an
order such as the one before us. Among them are: (a) whether
Congress can close the mails to obscenity by any means other
than prosecution of its sender; (b) whether Congress, if it can
authorize exclusion of mail, can provide that obscenity be de-
termined in the first instance in any forum except a court, and
(c) whether, even if Congress could so authorize administrative
censorship, it has in fact conferred upon postal authorities any
power to exclude matter from the mails upon their determination
of its obscene character.2 1 7
Thus, it may be germane to point to postal practice as a likely
focal point for future Court attention, suggesting that the Marcus-
Kingsley Books standards will provide the measure against which it
will be considered. However, this rests on the assumption that the
stoppage or destruction of mail would be regarded in the same light as
the seizure in Marcus, or injunction of sale in Kingsley Books.
It might even have the effect of a prior restraint on communication
in violation of the First Amendment, or the infliction of punishment without
the due process of law which the Fifth and Sixth Amendments guarantee.
Impounding one's mail is plainly a "sanction" for it may as effectively
close down an establishment as the sheriff himself. The power to impound
at the commencement of the administrative proceedings is not expressly del-
egated to the Post Office, as I have said. [Under the 1960 law this power has
been expressly delegated. Statute cited, supra note 184.] It carries such a
grave threat, it touches so close to First, Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights,
it has such serious possibilities of abuse (unless carefully restricted) that I
am reluctant to read it into the statute.
In the decision Mr. Justice Douglas refused to void the interim order after he
was assured that it would be litigated in the courts as a result of the normal
appeal process.
213. 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
214. Id. at 497.
215. Ibid.
216. Ibid.
217. Id. at 497-98.
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Under Section 1461 there is no prior judicial determination of ob-
scenity-no prompt, final, judicial determination. Under the Postal
Obscenity Law formula, the order which the district court is to grant
ostensibly provides for no prior judicial determination beyond a find-
ing of "probable cause" of statutory violation. It bears remarkable
similarity to the seizure condemned in Marcus. The statute envisions
issuance of the injunction on "probable cause" of statutory violation,
not on any determination of obscenity of particular items. The fact
that there is no time limit imposed on the duration of the injunction is
in clear violation of the standards in Marcus, as is the non-judicial
character of the final determination.21  The procedure under the
regulations in force prior to the end of 1961 also revealed inconsisten-
cies with the Marcus decision. The prior judicial determination require-
ment was ignored, and the twenty day duration of the order (extend-
ible by court order) may well have been excessive in view of the facts
of Kingsley, in which the Court reluctantly conceded the constitution-
ality of a statute where the maximum detention was three days. Also,
the final determination of obscenity was not made in a judicial hear-
ing. CONCLUSION
The past few years have seen considerable examination of and
change in the posture of legal institutions toward obscenity and its
regulation. Although enforcement of criminal statutes still remains
a tested device with a long and honorable history, the introduction of
the scienter requirement and the tough attitude of appellate courts in
this area219 have proved limiting factors on their efficacy. That the
period of 1956 to 1960 almost exclusively represented efforts of control
by criminal enforcement is open to little questioAi.220 However, the
218. 26 Fed. Reg. 12772, amending 39 C.F.R. § 201.1-.31 (Supp. 1961).
219. E.g., People v. Richmond County News, 9 N.Y.2d 578, 584, 175 N.E.2d
681, (App. Div. 1961):
The broader the prohibitions we read into our statute, the more unlikely it
is that these probitions are reasonably related to the legitimate ends which
the legislation seeks to serve. Thus, the constitutional background of the
legislation, the inherent nature of the subject of regulation and the avail-
able knowledge concerning the possible effects of such legal regulation all
point to and necessitate a very limited definition of the statutory prohibi-
tion of obscenity.
220. One research project found but four civil proceedings against alleged
obscenity. Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Con-
stitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REv. 5, 10-11 n.36 (1960). (1) In Ohio against
the Mahoning Valley Distributing Agency to enjoin the distribution of 14 maga-
zines and 4 books including Playboy and Lady Chatterley's Lover. (2) In Georgia,
the state literature commission obtained an injunction against the sale of the
paperback novel, Turbulent Daughters. (3) In Illinois the city of Chicago sought
an injunction against a news wholesaler restraining the distribution of alleged
obscene material, but the superior court voided the ordinance on the grounds that
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effect of the late 1959 Smith decision, which has yet to receive specific
interpretation, has hardly been felt. Recent restrictions on the opera-
tion of criminal regulation aside, state legislators have reflected dis-
satisfaction with enforcement by criminal prosecution during that
four year period in at least nine instances,2 21 as did Congress in the
passage of the Postal Obscenity Acts of 1956 and 1960.222 Several
state statutes have involved a procedure similar to that upheld in
Kingsley Bookss.2 23 Others have followed the Massachusetts lead, de-
termining obscenity by declaratory judgment, establishing a basis for
imposition of later criminal penalties.224 In the absence of specific
there was no requirement of scienter. (What scienter has to do with a civil
procedure remains to be seen.) (4) The Missouri procedure in Marcums. In New
York a defendant in a criminal prosecution complained that he should not be
prosecuted in the absence of a warning or notice of injunction proceeding, but
his motion to dismiss the information was dismissed almost summarily. People
v. Richmond County News, Inc., 8 Misc. 2d 162, 167 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Ct. Spec. Sess.
1957). The defendant was subsequently convicted of selling an obscene magazine.
People v. Richmond County News, Inc., 13 Misc. 2d 1068, 179 N.Y.S.2d 76 (Ct.
Spec. Sess. 1958). r'ev'd 9 N.Y.2d 578, 175 N.E.2d 681 (1961).
221. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.011 (7) (Supp. 1961); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-6306
(a) (Supp. 1961); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1510 (Supp. 1961); MiCH. STAT. ANN.
§ 27.1410 (1) (Supp. 1959); OHIO Rav. CODE ANN. § 2905.343 (Supp. 1960);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 3832.1 (Supp. 1961); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 11, § 31-13
(Supp. 1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 269.565 (Supp. 1962). Other states have
procedures based on statutory schemes of longer duration: California, Massa-
chusetts, Missouri and New York.
222. Statutes cited note 184 supra.
223. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 26-6306 (a) (Supp. 1961); IDAHO CODE ANN. §
18-1510 (Supp. 1961) ; N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 22(a) (Dennis Cum. Supp. 1959) ;
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2905.343 (Supp. 1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 3832.1
(Supp. 1961); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 11, § 31-13 (Supp. 1961).
224. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272 § 28(c) (Supp. 1959):
Whenever there is reasonable cause to believe that a book which is being
imported, sold, loaned, or distributed, or is in the possession of any person
who intends to ... is obscene, indecent, or impure, the attorney general or any
district attorney within his district, shall bring an information or petition
in equity in the superior court directed against said book by name. (Then
follows material with respect to notice to interested persons such as the
author.) After the issuance of an order of notice under the provisions of
this section, the court shall, on motion of the attorney general or district
attorney, make an interlocutory finding and adjudication that said book is
obscene, indecent, or impure....
Section 28d provides for a jury trial if the same is requested and section 28f
provides for a hearing and adjudication on the merits should an appearance be
entered and an answer flied. This procedure evoked favorable comment in
Lockhart and McClure, Obscenity and the ATts, 20 LAw AND CONTEMP. PROB.
587, 607 (1955). E.g., State civil prior restraint statutes involving a declaratory
judgement or book libel: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.011 (7) (Supp. 1961); MASS.
ANN. LAWS c. 272 § 28c (1956); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 269.565 (Supp. 1962).
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legislative schemes for prior restraint, capability for such regulation
has been demonstrated in at least one state under existing law.225
Without statutory authority, the state has the power and obligation
to protect health, welfare and morals of the public. The doctrine of
public nuisance is ancient authority for protecting these values under
the powers of a court of equity.22
As is often the case, employment of new concepts has not oc-
casioned the shedding of the old. The Hie lin "prurient interest"
legacy yet survives, buttressed by the assumptions of those who form
the constituency for severe obscenity regulation.
Aside from discussion concerning the ability to show prurient effect
on an "average man," all the evidence there is on the subject suggests
that obscenity regulation is not undertaken for the sole or even chief
purpose of the prevention of directly induced social misbehavior.
Rather there are a number of reasons for which regulation is sought.
These aims have to do with the effect on those below community
standards, and the assault on the mores and sensitivity of the com-
munity as a whole.22 7 Recognition of that fact was implicit in the
index of "patent offensiveness" introduced by Mr. Justice Harlan
in Manual. Acceptance of such a standard of gross violation of com-
munity sensibilities without the appended "prurient appeal" might
well be subject to the amassing of sufficient precedents so that
such a high degree of judicial mystery would not be concomitant to
its application. A possible result is that new schemes consonant with
the procedural limitations envisioned in Marcus would be rendered
more enforceable. These might entail considerable restriction on the
circulation of rank pornography to the general populace, with freedom
of circulation for the remainder, perhaps subject to audience limita-
tion.228 However, such an approach envisions rejection of full reali-
zation of the goals of those who appeal for obscenity regulation. 20
225. Authorities cited note 168 supra.
226. See PRossER, TORTS § 71 (2d ed. 1955).
227. Jahoda 102-103, 140.
228. Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitu-
tional Standards, 45 MINx. L. REV. 5, 83-88 (1960). The authors suggest the
concept of variable obscenity. Id. at 77-78. This concept applies different stand-
ards to material by considering its audience. Explicit within this scheme is a
category of material which would be sold for adults only.
229. 1960 Hearings 10, 12.
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